Europe Is on Fire — and the Real Danger Is Bigger Than the Models Show

A new study warns that the area of Europe affected by wildfires could almost triple by 2100 if greenhouse‑gas emissions stay high. Under a low‑emissions future, burned land rises by about 39%. Under continued high emissions, it jumps by roughly 192% — nearly three times today’s average.[pik-

Those numbers are already alarming. But they may still underestimate how dangerous the situation really is. Not because the physics is wrong, but because the models assume humans will respond in time, in a coordinated way, with enough political will to cut emissions and adapt.

Reality may be harsher.

Two intertwined crises

Behind the headlines about burning forests, there are two intertwined crises:

1. A physical fire crisis driven by climate change: hotter, drier, windier conditions that make large, intense wildfires more likely across the Mediterranean, Western and Central Europe. 
2. A human response crisis: how our minds, media, and institutions perceive risk, set priorities, and make decisions — often too slowly and too short‑sightedly for the speed of the threat.

The first is measured in hectares burned. The second in attention distorted, decisions delayed, and action undermined.

Physicist Brian Greene has described how technological change is accelerating on an exponential curve. In the early phase, the curve looks flat; people think “nothing dramatic is happening.” Then, almost suddenly, the curve bends sharply upward and the system manifests in a way we are not ready for.

That is exactly how epidemics behave. And it is exactly how many people still perceive climate change: as something distant and gradual, not as an accelerating, exponential threat.

Why the wildfire numbers may be too optimistic

The wildfire projections are based on climate models combined with assumptions about land use, vegetation, and human fire management. They show:

• +39% burned area under strong mitigation (low emissions).
• +192% burned area under continued high emissions. 

But those outcomes depend on human choices: how fast we cut emissions, how seriously we invest in prevention and adaptation, how honestly we confront long‑term risk.

If social and political dynamics distract public attention from slow, complex threats like climate; reward short‑term narratives; enable lobbying and messaging that delay or dilute policy; and optimize economies and infrastructure for immediate efficiency rather than long‑term resilience, then the probability of ending up on the high‑emissions, +192% trajectory increases.

In other words, the “area on fire” is not only forests and fields. It is also the area of public attention consumed by noise instead of climate signal, the area of policy bandwidth occupied by short‑term optimization instead of long‑term survival, and the area of institutional focus that fails to internalize tail risks.

When the curve bends

Greene’s point about exponential change applies to both crises:

• Physical fire risk grows non‑linearly with temperature, drought, and extreme weather. Small additional warming can push regions past thresholds where fire behavior changes dramatically.
• Human response risk grows as societies become more locked into short‑term thinking, polarized discourse, and infrastructure that assumes a stable climate that no longer exists.

In the early phase, both curves look manageable. Leaders say, “We have time.” Citizens feel, “This is not yet my problem.” Then, within a few years or decades, the curves bend:

• Fire seasons become longer, more intense, and harder to control.
• Political windows for effective mitigation narrow as economies and infrastructures lock into high‑carbon pathways.
• Public discourse becomes more fragmented, making coordinated action more difficult.

By the time the danger is undeniable, the options are fewer, costlier, and more painful.

What this means for action

The lesson is not “panic.” The lesson is: reality can be more dangerous than our best models suggest, because those models cannot fully capture how human cognition and institutions will behave under growing pressure.

That means we must:

1. Cut emissions faster and deeper than current “moderate” pathways assume. Every fraction of a degree of warming avoided reduces the chance of crossing fire‑risk thresholds.
2. Treat risk communication and governance as climate policy. Rules for transparency, accountability, and long‑term risk assessment in media, finance, and politics are not a side issue; they are part of preventing a catastrophic trajectory.
3. Invest heavily in prevention and adaptation: early warning systems, fire‑resistant landscapes, resilient infrastructure, and communities trained to live with higher fire risk.
4. Protect shared epistemic ground: support media, education, and institutions that can withstand manipulation and keep long‑term, evidence‑based risks visible.

The choice

Europe’s wildfires are a visible symptom of a deeper condition: a planet warming under rising emissions, and a human decision‑making system increasingly shaped by incentives that reward short‑term gain over long‑term survival.

If we act as if the +39% scenario is guaranteed, we may wake up in a +192% world. If we act as if the cognitive epidemic is already in its exponential phase, we still have a chance to bend both curves — the physical and the social — before they bend us.

The area on fire is not only land. It is the future space of life on Earth. And it is still, just barely, in our hands.

More about this topic can be found in "Meteosensivity" related articles in the Index.

Mykola Iabluchanskyi together with Andriy Yabluchanskiy